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DOES THE CONSTIT"CTION
PROTECT
FREE SPEECH?
.
.
thoughtful men and women, witnessing the suppression
M ANY
of speech, by means both judicial and extra-judicial, in the
period through which we have just passed, have reluctantly concluded that our hard won .right of freedom of speech has been lost,
swept away in the flood tide of war enthusiasm. They point to the
example of the recent candidate for the presidency, Eugene Debs,
who is still.confined in a federal prison for words he uttered during
the w3r. They call attention to the fact that the {ate of Mr. De~s
is no worse than that of scores of other per5ons, mem~rs of his and
other minority groups, who have gone to jail since Aptjl, 1917, for
giving utteran~ to unpopular opinions. Finally, they show us a·
widespread wave of "anti-disturbance" legislation among our state
lc;gislatures during and immediately after the war.1
Things have now: quieted down. We no longer jump with apprehension at hearing the word "Bolshevist." . Attention is turning ta
the multitude \lf que..ctions arising out of our return to a de facto,
if not a de jure, state of peace. In the meantime, our federal
Supreme Court has had occasion. in cases ari~ing under the Espionage Act, to give us some authoritative expositions of the legal mean. ?ng of that frecd0m of speech guaranteed by our Constitution. It
seems desirable to see how far these detjsions have'laken us in setting out the limitS of lawful speech, before our interest is· entirely
diverted to matters more pressing.
"Congress shall make no law* * *abridging the freedom of·~
or of the press.''
the unyielding words of tlie First
Amendment, the first of the federal "Bill of Right!.'' S~ pro.
visions. are to be found
nearly all State constitutions.1 bo
words mean, literally, that neither Congress nor 1~1ature
pun-

These are

in

a.n

the

For ·references to these statutes and a criticism of their effectiven~
see 20 Cot.UKBIA L lb:v. 232 (Feb., 19:!0), and see a note in 4 AKIL L. Ra.
3J6 OD "ValiditY. of l.egUlation Apinst Dangerous Social
Industrial
·

1

·or

Propagmda." .
•:wiiite a few of the states .have taken this identical language.. most of
them have taken their free spee'ch clause from the New Yo& Constitution
o'f 1822, Art. 7, § 8. Thiis, the Iowa Constitution, Art. t, I 7, provides.-:
"Every person may speak, write and publish bis sentiments on .all aubjedl,
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ish words alone, no matter what they are? A few exampl~ will
show that such an absolute conception of the meaning of f recdom
of speech is untenable. A man might persuade another to murder
his enemy, he might defame his neighbor,_ he might perjure himself
on the wi~ess stand, he might indu~ a soldier to deseJt his post.
Surely, constitutional protection was not meant for him.
But if a -definition of free speech is not to ~ an absolute one,
applicable to all words, what is it to be? So far as the question
invol~es .Jegal rights sec~red by a constitution, we naturally tum to
the (iecisions of courts of final authorifY. whose function is to intcrpJ;:et tlie Constitution. The legal significance of many clau$es ·of
our federal Constitution has been determined. in this fashi1:>n. The
"commerce clause," by which the Congress was given authority to
regulate interstate conuiierce, and .the "due process of law" clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment are examples wh~ch readily suggest
themselves._
With the fr~ speech provision we have no such help. The
Supreme Court has said that the Bill ·of Rights fa the Constittition
was designed simply to embody certain general guaranties inherited
from English ancestors, which had always been subject to certain
well-defined exceptions arising· from necessity.• Sc.- the. free speech
clause does not prevent the exclusion of lottery tickets' or obscene
matteri from the mails; neither does it privilege words inter£ering
with pending proceedings in a court .of justice.• No doubt we may
safely say that speech which would be a common law tort or crime
is still a basis of liability despite a free speech clause.' But until the
recent cases under the ~ar-time Espionage Act came before the
Supreme Court there was little to mark out for us what the limits
being responsible for the _abuse of that right. No law shall be N$Sed to
restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the preu • • *"
•Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U. S. 275. :.281.
:
•In re Rapier, 143 U. S. no.
•Ex parte Jackson, 96 U. S. '121·
•Gompers v. Bucks Stove and Range Co., 221 U. S. 418. Accord, Field
v. Thornell, 1o6 Iowa 7, article commenting on merits of prosecution's case,
delivered to members of the jury before the cause was submitted to them.
• Chafec in 32 HARV. L. REv. 943. citing Mr•. Jtistice Holm~s in Frohwerk
v. United States, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 249, 250: "The First Amendment * • •
obviously was ·not intended
give immunity for every possilile use of Jan.
guage • * * We venture to believe that neither Hamilton, nor Madison. nor

to
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of free speech are.• St8:J1dard treatises on constitutional law devote
little space to a discussion of the First Amendment,9 and indeed
their·authors had little on which to base sutjl discussion. The Sedition Act of 1798 made it a Criminal offense to publish false matter
against ''either· house of the Congress of the United States or
the president of.the United States with intent to bring th~m or t>ither
of them into contempt or disrepute." There were convictio~ under
·this act shocking fo. one,s sense-of justice.10 but it eicpired by its own
limita~ion before Chief Justjcc Marshall-reached the Supreme Bench,
and before the court had annoonced its authoritv to· declare an act
of Congress unconstitutiqnal. ·Good authority, Jeff~r~n included,
believed the law in conflict. with th~ Constitution.11 Again, in 1861,
any other competent ~on then or l!Lter, ever supposed that to make criminal the counselling of' a murder • • • would be an unconstit11tional intcrfer.ence with free speech.•
·
•Legal "periodicals have been full of ·well written discussions of this subj~

recently, several of the ~e.s dealing with the historical basis of. free
speech problems. The present writer has nothing original to add to wba~
has been said on the historical" poinL For the different theories regarding
what freedom of speech and press ·means. ·sec Pound, "Equitable Relief
.Against Defamation,~ 29 HAJW. L. R!v. 64o. 6So. Professor Chafee, in "Fretdom of S~ in War Time," 32 HAJW•. L. ~- 932. ~laborates and.discusses
the theories. His crificisni of Blackstone's conception that f~m here
means freedom from censorship, and a s~d theory, ·that freedom of spcecb
distingiiishes "use" and "abuse" of utterance, is so complete that 'further
elaboration is unnecessary. With this essay, too, may be found a long and
useful list of references on the topic in ~neral In addition, on the historical side, sec "Constitutionality of Sedition La'WS)" by M. G. Waitace, 6 VA.
L. Rzy. 385; "Freedom of Speech and the .Press in the Federalist Period;
The Sedition Act,• by Tbomu F. Carroll, 18 M1cu. L. ~- 615; 'The Power
of Government over Speech and Press," by F. G. Hart, 29 YAU L Jou.. 4IO.
Since this discussion was -written has appeared "Freedom of Speech and
Press under the First Amendment: A Resume." by Prof. Edward S. CorwiO:
30 YA~ L..JoU1. #/! (No~... 1!)20)..and comment thereon by C: E. C. on page
68 of the i:ame number. •.
• ~e,· for iAstance, the ·paucity of treatment in a work like Wn.t0ucsn
OH TBt CoKSTiTU'l'ION,.§f-45(), 451.
»united States v. Callender, 25 Fed. Cas. No. 14. 709; United S~tes T.
Cooper, 25 Fed. Cas. No. 1.c, IJt>s.
:n Sec M. G. Wallace in 6 VA. L. ~- on 386. and authority (:ited. In
Abrams v. United States, infra, Mr. Justice Holmes says: "I had ~onceived
that the United States through many years bad shown its reperitancc for the
Sedition Act of 1798 • • ·• by repaying fines that it imposed.•
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ap act punished conspiracy to levy war against the United States,
bu.t nothing decided tmder it gives an authoritative exposition of
the right of free spccch.
Of more than usual interest, then, are ~e cases whir.h our Supreme
Court has decided under the recent .Espionage Act.12 ·Hot all of the
decisions ~re worihy of notice here, for some of. them ~ent off on
technical points.. Others are vel)Z. important. As ·might be expected,
s0me of them have been the subj~ct of hot contrcJYersy. The brilliant ~issent of Mr. Justice Holmes in the ~amot1S Abrams v. {T,.iltd
States case, of which more hereafter, was callea by different (and
differing) writers in one of our best legal periodicals "shocking in
its· obtuse indifference to the vital issues at stake in Augµst, ig18;
and * * * ominous in its portent ~ lik~ indifference to pending and
coming issues,"11 and ' 1a literary and judicial ctas5ic'' the courageot11
language of which "saves from pessimism those who still have fait:J
in our Bilt of _rights.'11•
·
·
11
The Espionage.Act was passCd by Congress June 15, 1917. . Title
One, Section Three of this statute made it a crime, w.hile the United
States is at war, "(1) to mak~ false statements with intent to ititerfere with the operation of our fighting forces; (2) to cause or attempt
to cause disloyalty or insubordination in army or navy; (3) . willfully to obstruct or attempt to obstruct recruiting. In 1918 the list
of crimes was greatly enlarged to reach ;'individital disloyal utterances.'! · Nine ·mare offenses were added.18 Such proSccutions as
have been pa$sed upon in .the Supreme Court decisions have not,
however, brought the broader
. prohibitions. of the amended act under
u Sugarman v. United States, 249 U. S. 182, 39 Sup: Ct. Rep. 191 (not
an important case on development of the law. : The court decides that an
instruction given was sub~tantially equivalent to the one asked) ; Schenck v.
United Stites, 249 U. S. 47, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. -247; Frohwerk v. United States,
249 U. S. 204. 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 249; Debs v. United StatCs,.249 U.·S. 2u, 39
Sup. Ct. Rep. 252; Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S. 616, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep.
17; Stilson v. United St.ates, 250 U. S. s8J.. 40 Sup. Ct. 28 (deals wilh procedural matters only); Schaefer v. United States, 251 U. S. 466, '40 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 259; Pien:e v. United States, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 205; O'Connell v. United
States, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 444 (deals wilh procedural maUers) •.
u Dean John H. Wigmore in 14 ltJ.. L IU:v. 539. 54S. · ·
"See note by L G. C., 14 Iu.. L. R!:v. 6q1.
u u. s. CoKP. STA'I'. s. 1917, § 10212C..
"Act of May 16, 1918, l:T. S. Coin. STA'I'. 1918, ! 102I2C.
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its scrutiny. It cannot be said on authority, for instance, whether
"abusive language about • * * the uniform of the Army of the
United States" (one of the crinics under the amended act), spoken
by a perspiring second lieutenant on a sticky August day about ~is
leather puttees, is given immunity by the free speech clause of the
Constitution or a.ot. But while the cases decided by the Supreme
Court under this statute by no
give us a complete text-book
on free speech, they are worth noticing somewhat in detail, for they
are the most ~t authority we haft.
·
· Stlrffcll v~ United States1' ·affirmed the conviction. of Schenck,
general secretary of the Socialist party, for conspiracy to cause and
attempt to cau,se insubordination in the military forces and to obstruct
enlistment service. Schenck was found to have been instrumental
in sending-out a circular, which attacked the conscription act~ to men
who had been called anci accepted Jor miiitary ~rvice. From the
reported decisjon if ~ppears that the ~fendant did not deny that
the jury ·could have found the circular was intended to induce drafted
me~ to obstruct the operation qf the:selective service law.
Mr. Justice Holmes, delivering the unanimous opinion of the
c:oW:t, made Clear two points: first, .the right of free· speeCh, under
which Schenck claimed immunity,·is not an absolute and unchanging
thing.· War does make a difference. "When a. nation b at war many
things that might be. said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its
efforts that their _utterance
not De endured so long a!' men fight."
Where the lawmaking body may draw the line we are not told.; this
·question was nOt before the court. The defense seems to have
admitted that Congress could lawfully penalize interference with
fighting forces." The only question then was, how far. could the law.
go in punishing a conspiracy for attempting to interfere?
The second important thing done in this decision is to lay down
a t~ of liability for ~: · ·

means

wm

"The question in every case is \1{hether the words are used
in such ciroumstances and are of· such a nature ~ ~ creaJe

acle~r and present danger that they will bring about the nb-

stantivt etiils thal Congress had a right to pr(ilenf.'#1•
• ~ U. S. 4fi, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 247•
•Italics are miDe.

MICHIGAN LAW REV/SW

This is. very -important; the liability is not to be found in the general
effect of the words, nor in what may be thought to be their dangerous tendency. !~stead, the test is similar to the common law liability
for attempt to conunit a crime--the act done_ by the wrongdoer must
have come dangero~ly near to success.1• ·•success'' in this instance
would be the substantive ~vii specifi~d· by Congress in the statute,
interference with fighting forces of the country in war-time.
In two other cases the same month, March, 1919, the unanimous
court, again through Mt.". Justice Holmes, reiterated the same criterion of "clear and present danger," in affirming the conviction of
Frohwerk,20 of the Missouri Staats-Zeitung~ and that of Eugene
Pebs.2 ~ The· Debs ~e has been unpopular in some: quarters on the
groundo> that the accused was convicted merely because the jury
thought the· speech, upon which the charges against him were based,
had perhaps some general ~endency (as distinguished from a clear
and present danger) to bring abc;iut resista~ce to the draft.:12 Whether
or not that i~ the fact, the Supreme Court does not change its first
statement of the law governing .liability for ~
In November, 1919, ·Was decid~ the ·case of ~brams v. United
State~," probably the most widely known of all the Espionage~.
the conduct of which has prov.ok~ much adverse diseussion.1 • .The
defend~ts in tl!is qtSe ha<t prepar~ arid distributed circulars for the
p1:1rpo.se of opposing participation by the United' States ·in the campaign against the Bolshevik government.· 11te circulars were abusive
of the president, denounced· an alleged tinion Qf capitalism a~d militarism i~ the allied n;itions, and made the stoc~ appeal to ~e workers
for a general strik~ as a reply to the ''barbaric intervetition.~ The
defendants were convicted under the amended Espion~ ·Act, atTd
the conviction affirmed by a divided Supreme Court, Justices Hotines
See Joseph H. Beale, "Criminal Attempts." 16 HAllV. L· Rtv. 491.
• Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U. S. 204. 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 24!J.
:n Debs v. United States, 249 U. S. 211, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 251
.. See 19 NEW R£Pus1.1c 19: 19 NEW Re-um.re 151. This is Professor
Chafee's view. ~e p. g68 of his article, above cited, in 32 HARVARD ·I.Aw
u

REmtw.

"250 o. S. 6i6, 40.Sup. Ct. Rep. 17.
·•The best the writer h3s seen is that of Professor Z. Chafee; "A Contemporary State Trial-:-Th"e United States v~rsils Jacob. Abnuhs. el a~.,'i ·33
H.~n. L. .R!v. ·~41.
·
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and Brandeis dissenting. · Despite th~ fact that the judges disagreed.
it is difficult to put a finger on the exact difference between majority
and minority.as to
law. The dissenters urged that there was
n9 evidence on which a jury o'f reaso~ble men cou}d find against
the defendan~s. "The surreptitious pu~lishing, of a silly· l~ct by
an Unknown man:• £Guld not ·present any immediate danger of interf erc;nce with .tile. success· of go.vemment arms, thought the ·minority.
Tlie ~jority opinion spends little
in diseussing the· Ici.w, s~
ing to assume con~titutioncll points settled by th~ previous· ·cases
·already mentioned. It denounces the c0nduct of the defendants and
deems the evidence sufficient to .sustain their conviction. Professor
Chafee's able. discussion of the history. of the ca5~ make$ one believe
that great i~jtistice ~ been done the individuals coridemned to spend
tlre best part ·of their liv~ 'in jail.•. But the majority's .opiniot) does
1JOt.-write.that injitstice.into the law, at least
far as the ·language
goes. It miglit as well have bcet.i a ~emo~um. decision affirming
the conviction, for
the help it giyes in defining a>Qstitutionat limits of free speech•. The·dissent.of Mr;.justice irolines, ~hcther right
or wrong iii his vicW of the faqs, is ·a~·.ne ~ression·of pragmatic
legal philosophy and well deserve$ to be called:"a literary and judicial classic." It .bas ~ ~dely quot~, but. it is eloquent enouib
to des~rve r~~on of an .~cerpi· whi~ is w~ ~Cral readinp:

the

time

.so

an

. ;,Persecution-for .the CJCR~OD. Qf "opinion$ seems to ~e
perfectly.logical.\ Ify~uhave no.dotibt·_9f·your p~ or
your power,. and. want .a ~... resiiJt with
ybur heart.
you naturally· CJCprcss your wishe5 ~-. taw and sweep away
all opposition. To·allow opposition-.by speech seems to indicate that you.think the speech impotent. as ·when a man says
that he has 5quared the circle, or that you· ·do. not care wholeheartedly for the result, or tliat you dou1>t ·either your powu
or your premises. But when men have realized that time has
upset many fighting faiths; they inay ~OJDe to believe even
iitore t~ they believe 1he veey foun~tiomi of their own
condoct,- that ~c uitimate good desi.red is better reacned by
free trade in ideas-that the ml 'test of t,mb is the ·pow.er.
of th~ thought to get itself a".Of'Plr d .in the competition ci

au
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~e market, and that truth i6 the only ground upon which
their wishes:ijafely tan be carried out. That, at any rate, is
the theory of our Constitution.. ·It is ·an experiment, as all
life is an experiment." Every year. if not every day. we
have to. wager.our salvation upon some prophecy based upon
imperfect knowledge. While {hat experimel!t is part of our
system, I think that we should be eternally vigilant ;tgainst
attempts to -ch~ th«; expression of opinions that we loath
and l>elieve to ·be. fraught with death, unless they so immi·nently threaten immediate interference with the lawful and
pressing purposes of the law that an immediate check is
reqtiired to save the eountry.·• ••Only the _emergency that
makes it iir.mediately dangerous to leave the correction 9f.
evil counsels to time war1CU1ts making any exception to the
sweeping conunhnd, 'Congress sha,11 make no law abridging
the freedom of spcC!ch.' ·• ** ~ I regret that I cannot put into
more. impressiv~ .words my· belief that in their conviction
upoil this indictment ttie .defeiidants ·were d_epriv~ of their
rights under the Constitutian of the United States:-"

In Mar~ 1920, we have the last two· important Espionage decisions. In each, Justices Holmes and Brandeis dissent. The first
c:aSe, that of Schaefw v. United States,27 affirmed the convietion of
officers of an obscure Pennsylvania concern publishing a weak little
German newspaper. Agai~ the majority· opinion discusses facts for
the most part Mr. Justice -McKenna, speaking for the majority of
of the <:ourt, says that when free speech or any right. "becomes
wrong by excess iS· ·somewh;lt elusive of dcfiniti~," and he does
not tell us where he will draw the line. Mr. Justice Brandeis reemphasizes the "clear and present .danger" criterion of liaJ>J1ity, and
the majority do not dispute his test.
•This thought is. too. much {or. Dean Wigmore to stomach, and in hil
discussion in
Iu.. I.. REv., on p. S(ir, he sets it out in capitals with an
abundance of exclamation points. He says: "* • • when found publicly
ttcorded in an opinion of the Supreme Guardians of that Constitution,
licensing propaganda which in the neXt ~before the court ma:r ~·ditteted
agafust that Constitution itself, this language is ominotis indeed." Does
Dean Wsgmore mean that our Constitution is the last step pos_sib1e in the
evolution of government,
hence above criticismP
•-to Sup. Ct. Rep. 25

I•
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rJCfiE SPEECH

495

It seems to the writer that the last case decided, Pi4ru v. Unit14
States,21 March 8, lg20, is the most important decision since the
Schenc~ case, the first under the :ict. It was a particufarly striking
one on its facts, and even· a reading of the decision of the majority
of the court, which sustained the conviction of the defen<tants,
makes one feel that the pnni~hing of the prisoners was very harsh.
The act done by the defendants was the distribution of a pamphlet sent out from Socialist headquarters to the Albany New York,
"local" for dis~ribution. When the literclture first an-Wed the question of its distribution was 'brought up, and acting on the advice of
a la'Wyer mC'mber, the Albany group voted to postpone their circulalion of the matter until the outcome of a Maryland prosecution,
involving the same pamphlet, was determined. The Maryland judge
ordered an acquittal of the defendants in the prosecution before him.
It seemed safe, therefore, to go ahead in Albany, and this was done.
But the distnoutors were arrested there, a jury readily convicted
them, and their conviction was affirmed by the Supreme Court.
The literature which brought these men to grief was a four-page
leaflet written by Irvin St. John Tu~r, an Episcopal clergyman.
who,· as Mr. Justice Brandei.~ points out, was a man of sufficient
prominence to have been included in "VVho's .Who in AmeriC:a" for
1916-1917. The ~phlet pictured the horrors of the war, though
not more vividly than some of the descriptions an~ pictures that.8
ben~volent censor permitted to come before our eyes from: of!icid
sources.. It argued that the misery depicted wa.c; the logkal outcome
of .the refusal of the people to accept Socialism. It called atter.tiGn
to rising food prices, stated that •'The attorney general of the United
·States. is SQ busy sending to prison men w~o do not stand up when
'The Star-Spangled Banner' is ptayed. t}jat he has no. time to protect:
the food supply from gamblers." Though no harsher than charge!
made by opponents since, this must have been a sore point with tile
prosecution for it was felt nee°..ssary to 'show that clvi~ians were
n~t compelled by law to stand wherr the National Anthem was
played·~

Injustice may have been done the particu1.iir individuals involved.
11iat is a question that could_ only be fairly passed upon after exam• 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 205-
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ination of the whole record of the case in upper and lower couris.
Even then opinions might well differ. But it seems to the writer
that the decision is important because the" majority opinion, this
time through the very able Mr. Justi~e Pitney, adopts the doctrines'
technically known as- "indirect causation" and "constructive intent"
as a source of liability. If the majority of the court does adopt
them, t.;en the decision is most important and the Espionage Act
has· become a "most effective c;ilencer. of all but. the most polite discussion for all war-time. periods until it is repealed.
The doctrine5 mentioned are of long standing,'' but for .a hund:Cd and twenty years had .not been applied i~ the United States.
Their meaning can be ~sily explained. Admit that the evil the
statute is aimed to prevent is· one regarding which Congress bas
power to exercise preventive measures, causing insubordination in
the artny, for instance. What words come within the penalty of
the -law? May
::pCech which might be said t~ have· some tend·
ency, however remote, to btj_ng about ·acts in violation· of law be
puni$h~d, or only words which directly incite to acts in violation
of-law? Suppose that a man criticizes anny food, do not his words
have ·s0me <tendency, at least in the mind of a jury with a strong
imagination and in thorough s}rmpathy with the war, to cause Unrest
and subsequent insubordination among soldiers? And it ,wouldn't
matter, would it, whether the words were said Clirectly to a soldier,
or to a woman's club some of whose members had relatives or
friends· in. the army? Under this doctrine· of "indirect causatian"
words can· be punii;bed for supposed bad tendency long befor.e the
probability arises·that they will break into unlawful ads. It is obvious th~t this test of liability is in sharp eont~st with the "clear and
present dtinger".rule of Mr.Justice Holmes. It,has far-reaching
co~u~ces. What rabout the man who denounces an excess
profits tax bill? Do not his words have a tendency to encour.ige
anOtber to violate the law? What of the Arizona statesman who is
!'Cp9rted to have said that i~ the ·united States Government gave
Caranza permission to take trooi>s through his State he hoped the
people would. prevent their
Did 1tis words not have a
"tendenci' to _provoke vi~lence? Any person of influence who'

at•

passage.

•patter discussion of these doctrinrs ma,- be found in Professor Cbafee'•
article, p. 948 el 1tq., in 32 H.uv. L. ~.
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expresses an opinion in some way remotely encourages another to
act in accordance with the opinion expr,essed.
Hand in hand with th~s "indirect causation" doctrii~e goes thal
of "constructive intent." The only intent the deiendant must ban
is intent to write or si>eak the words lie did. If the words have a
bad tendency we will presume the man intr.nded unlawful consequences, on the gro1,U1d- that he is presumed to intend the consequences of his acts. Now we have many places in the law where
a man is liable for .consequences even when he did not specifically
intend them. If he shot off a gun at random in a crow1k4 street_
and killed someone, he certainly could not escape pgnishment by
saying he didn't intend ~o kill his victim. We ·can Ftay that
is
presumed to intend the natural consequence of his act, which is
pure fiction." We may accurately say that specific intent to-.hit
the very per5on he did is not by law required in order to hold him
liable. But often crimes do require a spf.cific inten~ and if they
do, such intent must be proved.11 When a penal statute, such as
the Espionage Act, makes certain speech a crirrie, such as advocating curtailment of production 0£ things necessary to the prosecution of ·the war, "with intent * * * to hinder * * *.the United
States in the prosecution of the war," must not the words be taken
in ~ir literal sense? To go back to the answer of Mr. Justice
Holm~ in the Abrams case:

he

1

~'They would be absurd in any other. A patriot might
think that we-we~ wasting money on aeroplanes; making
more ~on of a certain kind than we needed, and ~ight
advocate curtailment with success; yet even if it tumCd out

or

•But which is nevertheless stock language among those legal 'Writers
who are not careful of their speech. See, for example, .Hucsts, Canmr.AL
I.Aw AND PROCEI>uu. § ~ For a good disett5sion of the ~ccurac:y o(
the statement, see Professor Jeremiah Smith, "Surviving Fictions," 27 YAU>
L Jou-. 141. 1s().Is8. As Judge Smith points out, if the statement is true
that a JtlaU is really taken to intend the consequences of his acts, aery came
.of action based on negligence is turned into one for intentional wrongdoing.
And to such cases the doctrine of contn"butor)r negligence would not apply.
Steinmetz v. Kelly, 72 Ind. 442.
·
·
•McCLAIN, CRIMINAL I.Aw, § 123; BISHOP o~ CRlxINAI. LAW [;th ed.],
§ J42i see collection of decisions in Beale's CASES ON C.tKINAL I.Aw (3rd ed.],
beginning on p. IJ3.
0
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that 'the curtailment hind~red the United States in the prosecution of the war, no one would hold such conduct a crime.''la
Constructive intent". and "indirect causation" had appeared in
lower federal court decisions under the Espibnage Act.u Does the
Supreme Court adopt them in the Purce ca5e? Says Mr. Justice

Pitney:
· · '"Whether the statements contained in the pamphlets had
a ttatural tendency to produce the forbidden conseq11ences
* * * was a question to be dete_mined * * * by· the jury * * •
It wa.s shown without dispute that the d~fendants distnl>uted
the parripltlet-'The Price We Pay'-with full tmderstanding of its contents; and·this of itself furnished a ground for
attributing to thetn an intent to bring tibout * * * any ~nd all
si_lth. co_nsequences as reasonably might be anticipated fiom

its di.s'ln~PH

If the ~jorlty of our high".5.t .court are appt}ring tlie '"indi~
causation". and "constructive intent" tests as. a basis for. liability
Wlder fh"e EspiOnage. Act, ·w~ have an
C?CI>lanation for the
division of that body through the group of.decisions.beginning'1tiitb
.the.Abrams case.
This ends the diseussion of 'the constitutional right of free ·speech
by. our litg'hest ~urt.111 We probably shall ha~ ~o more light upmr
it from this· source in the immediate future.
·In determiQing what is the final eff~ of tltese acJjudications ·on
the law of free speech,. we should bear in mind:the foll«?wing: (.1)
That the Espionage Act is a ·w.ar-time statute. an~ the court has
emphasized a difEerence between the limits of speech. in w.ar··and ·
peace; (2) If the majon1y of the court has adopted the "indirc;cl
causation'! and "constructive 'intent" dOctrines they have not· in so
many. words· squarely overrultd .th~ SeR,enck ca~ with its criterion
of "dear and prese.nt danger-" and· told the minority that 'they were

easy·

•If' Sup•. Ct. Rep. 17, on p. 21. ·
•United States v. O'Hare, 253 Fed. 538; ·Masses. Pub. Co. v. Patten, a.w
Fed. SJJ. See a-J\ote on "T~ Espionage Cases," 32 li.u\·.:)'... ~. 417•
._Italies a~ mine. The ~xcerpt.is from 40 Sup. Ct. Rep., on page :zop.
•The last decision, O'Conn~ll v. U~ited States. 40 Sup. Ct. 444, merely
cit4:S pr~io\i's decisions as establishing the- constitutionality of lhe EspiOnqe
Act.
.
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doing so, and why; (3) At..-supsequent·. time the disagreements
the- ~ may be explained :as. pertaining. to the- facts only and the
. ~nority's expositi~n of the law may be: t4en as ·the doctrine of the
court.
-Finally, may. .we not ·be:..s}Ceptical ~ther.,. in. thiS present ·era of
"social" .thought ~P Qutloak, the .right. pf fh~ minQrity .to say what
it pleases
get the. ·.~gorous. Pr:c?tection against tlie :inajority'<S
desire to dictate what shaU .be said that it .wowd ·have rec~ved in
days w~ ilidiyidualistic notions 'Were .stronger? . the recatdtrant
minority is being compelled. constantly to· subjCct: ·itself ·to many
restrictions.upon its h~rty in doing
hcrctof~re ci>nSide~.ptr-_
fectly ·liwful. The one time saered right .of. freedom of contract is
fett~ed in ·evcey motion. · Laws i'Cgulatc. hours of laoo~; working
contiitions, thc;_people one may· hirc,.the minimum wage he is allowed
to pay, the ·damages he.-must ·give for ..indu~trial.accidents.• One
is told° wher~ he mq bµild. an: apartrrit;nt hQiise and where ".he may
no~11 His children must be vaccinated~ ins~ed,. arid. ~oiog
ically tested" befo{e· they c:an go to· school. ·If ·he iS a veµ~eal ~us
pect he is fUShed Willy nilly to a hospital for· inSpcctii;>n -~ treat•
ment.11 Pure;~ of mtoxica~l~ is . prevented by a con5titutional
am~dment; ·CYen the bu~ of· the i~ocuous ~·Camel~' or '"Fatima..
involves a breach of the ~aw in-~ S.tates... All of ~ in the
name. of ·protection to · society-is
. interpreted ··by:. the
. majority.

will

acts

•-An i~ense amo~ ~f ·tlijs·tegislation has. come :trithin.. tbe.~·ten
years. yet it $«IDS to be.accepted as a matter .of fact, ooCe the laws· att (Ill
the statute boob.
.
"'That this is ·lawful under the power ~hminent do.main. is.~ holding
'Of the Minnesota case of State ~x iet. Twin.City. etc.;-CO. Houghton, 176'
· N~ W •. iS?. CoJJllllented· n~ in 4 MniN." L. Ro. So and 236, and in 18 Mlq:t.
I.: R!v. 523• i ~~w, of no·~~~ law ~~u!rlng passins a pSycholOgical·test examination u a. prerequisite to ~ctmission to schools,· btit there are schools .where
applicants ·for admission are ·testCct in
viay. Vaccination laws are of
C:ommon.
.
.

T:

.coum

this

· ··• 5ee·H 1286 et nq. of CoxP1L11J ·eo. oT low.A, 191g. See atso Ex..parte
BroWn, 1~..N. \Y."·522 (~eb:). The Iowa case of· Wragg v; Grifl!n. 170·N.
· W. 40C>, holding ~ta susPect could not be held fot the_puii)dse of making
a ~wusemwi ·test," was deC:ided before the pre5ent Iowa statute was passtid.·
s· low.A I.Aw BUI.UTJlf ·6j.
. . .
.
. •CoMPtt.!D Cong or lowA, ~tp, §§ 88(J6 d uq.
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Courts are upholding such "social" legislation with increasing sympathy," which is what we wish them to do. The majority opinion in
Loe/mer v. New York,u the New York bak.~rs' case, seems a long
way off. But will not the same kind of argument and the same line
of thought which upholds a law which restricts a
·in the contracts he may make, or limits him in the i.ise to which he may lawfully put his real estate, uphold a law limiting the exercise of his
tongue when the majority so wills it ?'1
Granted the question of fre~dom of speech is one of social values,
will not the advocates of free speech, as the champions of minimum
wage laws, nave to convince their fellow citizens that their cause is
righteous, that the benefits outweigh the dangers, that justice, fair
Phy, and the common good demand that every side, no matt~ how
unpopular, be given a hearing in the publjc's forum? Reverting to
Mr. Justice Holmes" again,' "The best test of truth is the power of
the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market."
There is the. place where the battle {or restriction of freedom of
contract has been won. If unrestricted speech cannot win in the
same field, we shall probably have to get aJong without it.66
HOBERT F. GoomtcD.
College of Law, St!lle Uni'l:e~sity·'!f Iowa.

man

a 1!)8 U. S. 4S. The time measured in years is not Jong, for the cas'c was
decided ·in 19o4.
a See Professor Corwin's article, cited in note 8, and .a suggestion. in a
note, "The EspiOnage. Act and the Limits of Legal Toleration," 33 Hav. J...
Rn-. 442. 447, for expressions of opinion somewhat along this line.
•In his dissent in the Abrams case.
.. Since the above discussion was written, tbe Supreme .Court has decided
the case of Gilbert v. Minnesoti (U. S; S. Ct., Adv. Opinions, Jan. IS. I92X.
p. 146): The defeudant was convicted for violati0n of a Minnesota statute.
enacted during the war, making it an offense to "advoca~ • • • that the
citizens of this state should not aid or assist the United States in prosecuting
or carrying on war with the public enemies of the United States." Defen.dant's conviction was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Minnesota and the
case came before the Fe4~r:al Supreme Cot~rt on proceedings in error. The
judgment was 'llffirmed; opinion by Mr. Justke McKenna; Mr. Justice Hohpes
concurred in
resulL · The Chief Justice dissented, as did Mr. Justice
Brandeis, who wrote a dissenting opinion,
It is to lie noted that no question of violation of the federal free speech
clause was involved; the· statute was a creature of the state legislature, not
congress. Nor· was the court called upon to review the correctne:;s of the

the
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state court's view of its own constitution; only questions of federal righti
were befor~ it. So denunciation of the.conduct of the accused, or diU~val
of the sweeping prohibitions of the statute, both found in the- opinions. are
not involved in the legal questions unless they bring in rights under law.-,
treaties, or the Constitution of the United States.
One ·ground of attack on the statute was that the jurisdiction .of ,Coagrea
to legislate upon the subject was exclilsive. It. wu upon this l'l"OUild that
the Chief Justice dissented, and Mr. Justice Brandeis •ls0. ~icd upon it
one reason for reversal. But the majority reject it, saying through their
spokesman: ~'Cold and technical reasoning in- its ininute consi~tioa 1m1'
indeed i.nsist on a separation of ·tht sovcr.cignties. •nd suistancc- in. ads to
any cooperatiop from the other, but there is opposing demonstration ia. ~
fact that tlUs c()Wl\ry is one composed of many,. and must on Occuicins be
animated. as· one, an~ that the constituted and constituting ~ereisntics -~mt
have tlie power of co0perati~ against the enemies of all. Of suds instance,
we think. .is the statute of Minnesota; and ·it 1oes .no farther!"
-Unless there wis some otb-er ground oo which a constitutional right
could be invoked. then, there was nothing to de>" kt affirm the. j~
It was contended fot plaintiff in error that tbQ statute WU .olJnoxiom. to tlie
"inherent right of free speech." Coric:eding there. is ·sue11 a riPt, ·l&)'S die
majority, it is subj~ to restriction and limi~ and cites the" l\spiaaqe
Act cases. Mr. Justice Brandeis, .eontend.ing that the. sf.:atute "afft:ets riPta.
prMleges, ~d immunities of one who is a citizen of the."Uniml Stata,•
and tliat it to affects him as to deprive him .of liberty, is alooc on this· groi:md
~~~~
.
It seems to- the writer that the decision ~einfor~ the COl>ClasitJn ~
set out above concemfug what we ·may expect· in the way of ·c:oatt
cnce on legislative -restrictions on speeCh. Reliance ·on ~ · ~
and immmiities oj citizens. wowd seem eYen Jes1.pi'otection. to cme 'riolaliDs
a restriction than a free speech provi.-. · ·

u
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